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“TAX NEUTRALITY” 
 
By 
 
Stephen UTZ 
University of Connecticut School of Law 
Hartford, Connecticut 
 
 
 
I met my honored friend and colleague Pierre Beltrame more than a decade 
ago, when my interest in technical and comparative aspects of taxation had just 
taken root. As many who know him will attest, he is one of the most generous of 
mentors, and he was at the height of his powers as a distinguished expert on French 
tax law. During my first short stay at Aix, we met several times. These conversa-
tions set me on the path to a deeper and more nuanced knowledge of the subject we 
share. I am proud of and grateful for my connection with our wonderful friend. 
 
Is tax neutrality an illusion? My honored friend Pierre Beltrame and his dis-
tinguished co-author Lucien Mehl once wrote: “[L]orsque le taux de l’impôt s’éléve, 
qu’il devient progressif, et que d’importantes masses monétaires sont redistribuées, 
le fait financier ne peut être neutre, stricto sensu, à l’égard, ni de l’ensemble de 
l’économie, ne de la répartition de revenu national” (Pierre Beltrame & Lucien 
Mehl, Techniques, Politiques et Institutions Fiscales Comparées, Presses Universi-
taires de France, Paris, 2d ed., 1997, p. 314). As they also observed, however, rela-
tive judgments of neutrality, judgments that purport to deal the neutrality of isolated 
elements of a tax system, do seem possible (op. cit., pages 314-315). Tax experts 
generally discuss tax neutrality today as if the distinction between absolute and 
relative neutrality were not of great importance. For example, they regard neutrality 
in the taxation of enterprises – the like treatment of formally different but economi-
cally similar juridical entities – as desirable, regardless of other non-neutral ele-
ments the tax system as a whole may embrace (op. cit., pages 380-386. The main 
purpose of this article is to explore the grounds for both these views – the impossi-
bility of absolute neutrality and the possibility of ascertaining the relative neutrality 
of a tax measure. 
 
As background, consider the following. France is today a leading supporter 
of the proposed common consolidated corporate tax base for Europe, whose purpose 
is to achieve greater capital import neutrality and export neutrality within the Euro-
pean Union. Seeking neutrality as well, many EU Members and the United States 
now impose roughly the same rate of tax on corporate dividends and other corporate 
distributions1. EU Members are also currently struggling to achieve non-
discriminatory tax treatment of corporate distributions to shareholders whose 
                                                           
1 Finland, Italy, the Czech Republic, Rumania, Poland, Germany and Ireland tax dividends at between 
12.5% and 20%, with 15% as the average and median rate. 
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residence is not that of the distributing corporation; non-discrimination is tax neu-
trality shaped by special concerns of the Treaty of Rome. These and similar 
developments in international tax policy are evidence of a widespread conviction 
that tax rules should not influence private economic decisions, at least when no 
intended non-tax purpose exists. Neutrality in this sense is of course not a new goal. 
Early classical economists, never reluctant to recommend tax reforms, were in broad 
agreement that widespread economic problems of their day sometimes resulted from 
unanticipated taxpayer response to tax legislation. Resurgent interest in this as a 
supremely important aspiration in tax design is striking.  
 
A tax measure is neutral if it dœs not influence the economic choices of eco-
nomic agents, chiefly, producers and consumers. Neutrality is not to be confused 
with fairness. A one-time tax levy, imposed without warning, would be neutral, 
because economic agents would not have an opportunity to alter their behavior in 
response to it (Carl Shoup, Ricardo on Taxation, Columbai University Press, 
Morningside Heights, New York, 1960, pages 25-40). Such a tax might be patently 
unfair, based on criteria such as age, height, or religious affiliation. Tax neutrality is 
thus concerned only with preventing the distortion of economic behavior by an ex-
traneous influence and not with the fairness of tax consequences to those who bear 
them. 
 
In this article I discuss the problems implicit in efforts to evaluate the tax 
neutrality of specific tax measures and then survey some high-profile recent appli-
cations of the tax neutrality standard. I then comment on the relationship between 
the recently promulgated rule under United States tax law according to which the 
usual tax consequences of a transaction are to be disregarded if that transaction lacks 
“economic substance.” The economic substance doctrine has evolved rapidly during 
the last two decades as an important weapon in the government’s struggle against 
allegedly abusive tax shelters. I therefore explore the link between that doctrine and 
tax neutrality as a goal of tax system design. Finally, I conclude that the economic 
substance doctrine weakens or abandons a useful feature of earlier case-by-case 
analysis of tax shelters that could and probably did help to make the United States 
tax system more neutral, whereas the results of the economic substance standard 
have no clear relationship to that goal. 
 
DISILLUSIONMENT WITH ABILITY TO PAY 
 
Before turning to the current prominence of tax neutrality as a standard of 
good tax design, it is worthwhile to notice that this standard seems to have eclipsed 
one of its chief and equally longstanding rivals. In the nineteenth century, John 
Stuart Mill’s brief but convincing account of ability to pay prompted tax economists, 
who were quickly becoming modern welfare economists, to analyze the relationship 
between income tax rates and the welfare burdens resulting from an income tax. 
Mill had assured his readers that “equality in taxation should be the rule,” because 
“[a]s a government ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength 
of their claims on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from them should be made to 
bear as nearly as possible with the same pressure upon all, which, it must be ob-
served, is the mode by which least sacrifice is occasioned on the whole” (J.S. Mill, 
Principles of Political Economy, John Murray, London, 1848, Book V (“On the 
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Influence of Government”), Chapter 2 (“On the General Principles of Taxation”)). 
Two strong claims are contained in this single sentence. The first is that “equality in 
taxation” is equivalent to taxation that imposes an “equal sacrifice” on each tax-
payer. “Equal sacrifice” is obviously more expansive than “equal exaction” or 
“equal liability”, both of which can be achieved only by a poll or capitation tax. The 
broader standard “equal sacrifice” obviously contemplates equality in some other 
respect. The second claim made in the crucial sentence suggests, without explicitly 
stating, what that other form of equality might be. Mill says that equal sacrifice by 
individual taxpayers assures that the sacrifice “on the whole”, viz., by all taxpayers 
collectively, will be the least necessary. Mill’s second claim is true only if he is 
measuring sacrifice in terms of utility and if higher income has a marginal utility 
that is the same for all taxpayers and diminishes in the same linear proportion for all 
taxpayers (Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 1959, pages 232-46). 
 
It may have seemed intuitively obvious to Mill and his contemporaries that 
all people have the same utility schedule for income in money and that this schedule 
assigns a linearly diminishing marginal utility to higher levels of income, but Mill 
and his contemporaries did not think of this in mathematical terms and their concep-
tion of utility may itself have differed from that which emerged as the standard con-
ception after the marginalist revolution in welfare economics (Stephen Utz, “Ability 
to Pay”, Whittier Law Review, Vol. 23, 2002, pages 867-950). 
 
In any case, recent commentators are so uneasy with Mill’s case for propor-
tional taxation of income that they distance themselves from equality arguments for 
or against the income tax (David Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1986, pages 178-197; Jœl Slemrod & 
Jon Bakija, Taxing Ourselves, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, pages 
112-115). (Mill was also an early proponent of the familiar utility-based fairness 
argument for consumption taxation instead of income taxation, and this argument 
assumes just as strongly that fairness must be understood by reference to a universal 
equal valuation of the cost of deferring consumption.) As enthusiasm has waned for 
ability to pay or any other utility-based standard of fairness as a basic design cri-
terion for broad tax systems, it is not surprising that tax neutrality has attracted more 
and more attention. 
 
A FRESH PURSUIT OF TAX NEUTRALITY 
 
Given that earlier political economists had focused primarily on tax neu-
trality, it was to be expected that the difficulties of ability to pay might restore tax 
neutrality to prominence as a topic of interest. As the twentieth century progressed, 
other writers saw tax neutrality as virtually the only topic worthy of economists’ 
attention. Nicholas Kaldor, Richard Musgrave, Carl Shoup – to mention only three 
public finance economists who have had a large influence on the English-speaking 
world – have all expounded clearly and incisively the importance of tax neutrality 
(Nicholas Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax, London, George Allen & Unwin. 1958; 
Richard Musgrave, The Theory Of Public Finance, New York, 1954; Carl Shoup, 
Public Finance, Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co., 1969). In this they clearly built on 
the earlier work of Arthur Pigou and Frank Ramsey, among others, in which it may 
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have been assumed too lightly that taxpayers have identical utility schedules for 
money but whose positive contributions to our understanding of tax neutrality were 
convincing in spite of that, because identical utility schedules might for this purpose 
have seemed to be merely a simplifying assumption that could eventually be re-
laxed, when the goal of neutrality was spelled out in more detail (Arthur Cecil 
Pigou, The Economics Of Welfare, Macmillan Publishing Co., London, 1920; Frank 
Plumpton Ramsey, “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”, in Foundations: 
essays in Philosophy, Logic, Methematics and Economics (ed. D.H. Mellor), Cam-
bridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
 
It is worthwhile to sample the current discussion of tax neutrality by noting a 
few recurrent applications of that notion. The following examples are chosen for the 
frequency with which they are mentioned by experts as well as for the contrasting 
demands they place on our knowledge of economic “laws” and facts. 
 
1. Substitution of untaxed for taxed goods. As economists began to analyze 
how markets interact, a conspicuous example was the effect of a tax on goods in one 
market with demand for substitutable goods in another market. For example, if a tax 
on tennis rackets raised their price by 1 monetary unit per racket, the demand for 
rackets should decline, assuming that there were potential consumers for whom the 
value of a tennis racket fell somewhere between the price with the new tax and the 
old price without the tax. These frustrated tennis players might spend their money 
instead on squash rackets if squash rackets were not taxed at the same rate as tennis 
rackets. Frank Ramsey’s innovative model of this phenomenon became one of the 
most admired illustrations of mathematical economics in the early twentieth century 
(op. cit., page 242). He demonstrated that it was possible to eliminate the non-
neutrality of a tax on consumer goods by ensuring that the tax also increased the cost 
of all substitutable goods to the same extent. 
 
2. The labor/leisure tradeoff. A widely recognized source of tax non-
neutrality is the distortion caused when a tax on wages operates to induce potential 
workers to prefer leisure to labor. This elicits comment from experts in many con-
nections. The labor/leisure tradeoff is notoriously easy to eliminate – but the cure is 
also universally regarded as a political impossibility. We would only have to tax 
leisure at the rate applicable to labor (presumably a rate per unit of time worked or 
enjoyed in idleness). Both income and consumption taxes fail the test of neutrality in 
this regard. Leisure is “consumed” without tax under both types of tax design. 
 
3. Tax burdens on consumption timing choices. A parallel but more easily 
remedied source of non-neutrality provides one of the standard arguments for prefer-
ring a pure consumption tax to a pure income tax. The argument is that the income 
tax discourages deferred consumption and the consumption tax dœs not, because the 
income tax falls both on an amount saved for future consumption as well as on the 
earnings from that saved amount, whereas the consumption tax falls only on the 
deferred consumption, which can be therefore be funded with the untaxed earning of 
the amount saved (David Bradford, Untangling the Income Tax, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1962; Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, “The Su-
periority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax”, 59 Stanford Law 
Review, 1413, 2006). An underlying premise is of course that the true value of 
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deferred consumption is its present value, measured from the time when the decision 
to delay the consumption is made. If this is conceded, it dœs follow that deferred 
consumption is taxed more harshly than current consumption. Note that the argu-
ment is not directed to the fairness of the heavier taxation of deferred consumption 
but to the apparent distortion of decisions whether to consume right away or to wait. 
Nicholas Kaldor, moreover, another consumption tax proponent has argued for pre-
cisely the opposite conclusion. Since people obviously do decide to defer consump-
tion, despite the alleged burden of the income tax on deferred consumption, he con-
cludes that deferred consumption always indicates the income-tax-paying 
consumer’s disproportionately strong preference for deferral. If so, the income tax 
burden should be seen as less of a burden, falling only on those whose desire for 
deferral is marginal (Nicholas Kaldor, An Expenditure Tax, London, George Allen 
& Unwin. 1958, pages 120-134). 
 
4. Differentiation in the tax treatment of dividends and interest on corpo-
rate debt. Taxes on corporate and other business profits have been scrutinized 
closely for suspected distortion of business investment decisions. Modigliani and 
Miller are famous for their analysis of the distortion built into a corporate tax regime 
that allows no deduction for distributions of earnings to shareholders but dœs allow 
a deduction for corporate payment of interest to creditors (F. Modigliani & 
M. H. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Invest-
ment”, 48 American Economic Review, pages 261-297, 1958). The point out that by 
discriminating between debt and equity in this fashion, corporate tax regimes like 
that still in force in the United States – the so-called “classical” or “double” corpo-
rate tax – biases corporations towards borrowing as an alternative to seeking capital 
contributions in exchange for ownership shares in the corporation. 
 
A variant on the debt/equity theme compares the tax consequences of the sale 
of corporate stock with the receipt of a dividend. The stock of a corporation that has 
undistributed earnings, earnings that might be distributed as a dividend, should in 
general attract a higher price than the stock of the same corporation without the 
earnings. In many countries, including the United States until 2004, the rate of tax 
applicable to the gain on the sale of stock is less than that applicable to the distribu-
tion of a dividend. The rate difference appears likely to make shareholders prefer 
selling their stock, especially in cases of small holdings of publicly traded stock, to 
receiving a dividend. Most publicly traded US corporations pay almost no divi-
dends. In fact, the received wisdom is that changes in a corporation’s invariably low 
dividend rate are intended more as signals to the stock market of the corporate man-
agers’ optimism or pessimism about the corporation’s future performance than as a 
reflection of past performance. 
 
Each of the foregoing examples of tax analysis in terms of neutrality is so 
familiar to most tax policy experts as to be almost platitudes of the field. It is also 
important to mention, in juxtaposition with these examples. When looked at from 
the government’s perspective, favorable tax treatment claimed by a taxpayer under a 
given tax rule may represent a misuse of the tax system if the transaction is eco-
nomically equivalent to other transactions that routinely receive less favorable tax 
treatment. To maintain the neutrality of the system, administrators therefore argue 
that economically similar transactions should receive similar treatment, and the 
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sought-after tax advantage should be denied. If enforcement of this standard of 
similar treatment were widespread and effective, disturbance of competition be-
tween at least some similarly situated taxpayers would be abated, and to this limited 
extent the tax system would cause less distortion to the economy. Prospectively, it 
would also restore economic agents’ reliance on non-tax motives for their economic 
choices. 
 
CAN WE JUDGE THE NEUTRALITY OF A TAX SYSTEM? 
 
Before describing how the goal of tax neutrality figures in current debates in 
the United States, it is useful to explain why real-world (as opposed to hypothetical 
or model-based) judgments about the neutrality of tax laws are simply beyond our 
reach2. 
 
The radical difficulties that beset our ability to determine the tax neutrality of 
actual laws are both difficulties of theory and difficulties about obtaining the rel-
evant evidence, though many commentators choose to ignore both. Consider first the 
evidentiary difficulties. We must bear in mind that tax neutrality is a matter of how 
people react to legal rules. Although we may intelligibly speculate about how ideal 
agents would behave in markets that are absolutely (i.e., unrealistically) isolated 
from other markets, as partial equilibrium models of single markets or industries 
illustrate, we do not know what a world without tax would be like. The most robust 
industrial countries have been taxed for so long that direct evidence of how their 
producers and consumers would behave in a tax-free world dœs not exist (William 
Popkin, “Tax Ideals in the Real world: A Comment on Professor Strnad’s Approach 
to Tax Fairness”, 62 Indiana Law Journal 63, 1986, pages 71-72). 
 
Even more basic is the intractable problem of gathering the data about mar-
kets in the real world. The admirable work of Shoven, Whalley and their co-workers 
who attempted to “apply general equilibrium” analysis of the US economy, using 
data collected over a thirty-year period by the US Department of Commerce, was 
limited, in the view of these researchers themselves, by the unreliability and incom-
pleteness of even this most comprehensive of available databases. It is unlikely that 
a better database will ever exist, even with unlimited funding, because we can only 
decide which data to collect based on fallible judgments of what is relevant. To 
decide which data are relevant, we need laws of economic causality to guide us. If 
we know that the values of variables x and y determine the outcome z, we must seek 
the actual values of x and y if we wish to predict (or explain retrospectively) the 
value of z. Rarely will we happen to collect the data needed for a prediction or ex-
planation without such knowledge or at least a narrow selection of possible correla-
tions, on one of which we expect to be able to rely, once we have done further em-
pirical testing. Data collection is, at least in this very weak sense, dependent on pre-
existing theory. 
 
                                                           
2 Without analyzing these difficulties at length, Professor Beltrame has succinctly pointed them out and 
bases his comparative examination of a range of specific tax institutions on the recognition that concrete 
judgments of tax neutrality are beyond our ability. Op. cit., pp. 314-315. 
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Difficulties about data, however, are only the beginning. Whether a given tax 
rule would be neutral, on its own or when added to a broader set of tax rules, is 
problematic for deeper theoretical and practical reasons. First, the counterfactual 
proposition that but for some tax rule people would make particular decisions differ-
ently can only rest on a strong predictive theory of human behavior. An important 
ambiguity affecting the goal of neutrality is whether only “rational” behavioral re-
sponses to tax measures should be considered to make them non-neutral. If irrational 
behavioral responses must also be considered, the evaluation of tax neutrality must 
depend on our first knowing how human beings actually behave that would go be-
yond any currently available psychological research. In order to say whether a tax 
measure produced a change in an economic agent’s conduct we would have to 
know, not just whether and how this agent would react to the measure ceteris 
paribus but also how the agent would react to the measure when all other circum-
stances are taken into account, i.e., when the ceteris paribus assumption is relaxed. 
The required level of factual knowledge and predictive capacity obviously gœs 
beyond anything of which we are now capable. Another theoretical weakness in our 
understanding of tax neutrality is that we must decide, and this is a theoretical rather 
than a practical decision, whether other concomitant events that are not causally 
dependent on the application of the tax measure to be assessed are to be considered 
in that assessment. For example, a tax measure that would be deter consumers from 
purchasing a certain kind of good, when other substitutable goods were readily 
available, could not do so if substitutable goods were all made unavailable by a cata-
clysmic accident of nature – e.g., famine might wipe out all other foods that might 
be substituted for taxed bananas, thereby preventing the banana tax from causing or 
increasing the non-neutrality of the tax system. 
 
Second, economists differ drastically in their views about even the most basic 
features of a complex economy. One need only mention the division between gen-
eral equilibrium theory (including “rational expectations” theory) and opposing 
theories (Keynesian or neo-Keynesian) that do not assume markets tend towards 
general equilibrium (tend to “clear” simultaneously). So far, it appears that there is 
nothing approaching consensus among the experts, concerning the choice between 
even these very broad types of theory – comparable almost to the choice between 
Aristotelian and Newtonian mechanics. 
 
Without such a consensus, it is possible, though the argument would be too 
complex for the scope of this paper, that collecting data needed to decide narrow 
questions like the tax neutrality of alternative tax rules could be done in a practical 
way. 
 
Third, there is no obvious measure of degrees of non-neutrality. We may 
have some intuitive sense that economic distortions caused by the tax law may be 
more or less injurious. Perhaps the obvious point of reference is the difference a 
given distortion makes in the social product over some long period of time. But we 
have no crystal ball for deciding when, how often, or even whether an economic 
system in the real world would ideally be in equilibrium and hence theoretically 
performing at its best; hence, we also cannot say what time frame is appropriate for 
applying this quantitative test for the detrimental effect of a given distorting influ-
ence (assuming that we could gather other relevant data for doing so). Other 
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measures of the severity of distortions are possible but we are so far from consensus 
on a common standard that we have not even noticed the need for one. 
 
Detecting the absolute difference in tax neutrality due to the new legislation 
may also be possible by means of a general equilibrium model of the economy sub-
ject to the tax system. To refer again to Shoven and Whalley’s attempt to “apply 
general equilibrium”, the prospects for the establishment of an authoritative general 
equilibrium model that might serve as a basis for predictions about a real-world 
economy is less than overwhelming. Nonetheless, the general goal of modeling 
general equilibrium for a particular country’s economy is not far-fetched. One of the 
difficulties this raises, of course, is whether the “laws” of economic competition do 
indeed favor equilibrium, as neo-classical economics holds, or disequilibrium, as 
Keynesian economics plausibly claims. Shoven and Whalley found it difficult, using 
the best data available, to identify a point in time at which the US economy was 
almost in equilibrium (John B. Shoven & John Whalley, Applying General 
Equilibrium [Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature], 1992). They were never-
theless committed to framing a model that assumed the economy tended towards 
equilibrium. 
 
One reason for the widespread delusion that we can know how masses of 
people react to the tax laws to which they are subject is the spurious analogy be-
tween economics and the physical sciences. Although scientists and philosophers of 
science no longer debate the topic heatedly, there is no doubt that economic hypoth-
eses are not seriously offered for testing and are rarely regarded by economists to be 
vulnerable to refutation when confronted with data. The principal reason for this is 
that their generalizations – like any other empirical generalizations – are true at best 
with hosts of variables assumed to be constant or not in play. But these qualifica-
tions are never stated, nor dœs field of economics contain any serious empirical 
research project whose goal would accomplish this. John Stuart Mill argued that the 
proper way to understand a generalization in economic theory is as an “inexact” 
statement, a statement that is true only ceteris paribus and yet for which we are not 
able even broadly to identify the “other things” that must be “equal” in order to 
these generalizations themselves to be true (See J.S. Mill, A System of Logic (1843); 
Daniel Hausman, The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics, 1992, passim & 
pages 123-125). 
 
It is true that hypotheses in physics and other “hard” sciences are also ac-
cepted or held to be well supported ceteris paribus. The difference is that we do 
have some idea what the circumstances are that must be assumed in order for these 
hypotheses to be applicable. Tests of these hypotheses sometimes refute them, and 
physical scientists agree that they do. It is true that the community of scientists bend 
over backwards at times to avoid recognizing that refutation has occurred, changing 
their ground about which “other things” must be assumed “equal.” The view that 
scientific revolutions hinge on such moments of resistance has been made famous 
by Thomas Kuhn and must be acknowledged. It dœs not follow, however, that day-
to-day testing of hypotheses in the phase of development that Kuhn called “normal 
science” is hobbled by uncertainty about confirming and disconfirming evidence 
(Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1960). 
Stephen UTZ 575 
 
The theoretical and practical problems briefly sketched in the last two para-
graphs should be obvious, when we compare the project of assessing tax neutrality 
with predictive and explanatory projects of the sciences. Although physics can pre-
dict much about relatively isolated macro-physical objects, applying the best con-
firmed physical laws to the description of such everyday phenomena as the flipping 
of a coin or the movement of balls on a billiard table is sufficiently problematic that 
we regard these phenomena as governed by chance. One reason for this difficulty is 
closely associated with a quite general problem afflicting causal analysis of all sorts. 
In order fully to appreciate the unsatisfactory character of economic analysis in 
causal terms, it is useful to consider this broader problem briefly. 
 
It has often been noted that “cause” is used variously in theoretical as well as 
in everyday contexts. One need only mention Aristotle’s four senses of the term – 
material, formal, efficient, and final – to illustrate the variety. Although modern 
theorists since the age of Hume and Kant have discounted the philosophical signifi-
cance of all but efficient causes, their goal has been the theoretical one of calling 
attention to the type of cause that seems most central to causal explanation in the 
sciences. Yet further analysis along these lines has stressed the paradoxical and 
incomplete character of our understanding of efficient causality, otherwise the most 
reputable member of its family. The problem is essentially that all the features of 
efficient causality that reflect our everyday understanding of the notion, taken to-
gether, still do not permit us to distinguish causes in this sense from concomitant 
events that we would not consider to be causes. The main features are four. First, a 
cause is supposed to have an invariable relationship with its effect – the effect al-
ways occurs when the cause dœs. Modern consciousness of logical relationships has 
prompted philosophers to gloss this feature more formally: a cause is a necessary 
and sufficient condition of its effect. No sooner had this proposal been formulated, 
however, than it was noted that not all causes are necessary conditions of their ef-
fects – some can produce the effect but are only one of several causes that do so – 
and causal imputations are virtually never complete enough to state sufficient con-
ditions for any effect that may be under scrutiny. For example, we may say that my 
pressing a button causes my desk lamp to turn on, but this tacitly assumes a host 
(arguably, an infinite number) of conditions without which the lamp would not turn 
on (electricity being supplied to the house, the wiring of the lamp being in good 
condition and properly designed for its purpose, the nonoccurrence of other condi-
tions that might cause the lamp too short out, etc.). Second, a physical cause is 
commonly expected to be an event that is spatially near its effect, but this feature is 
very often lacking, most notably, from causal explanations that are especially broad 
and have greater than usual explanatory power, such as causal physical explanations 
that rely on “action at a distance.” Spatial proximity of course is rarely a possible 
feature of economic causality. A drop in price, for example, may be thought to cause 
increased sales, even though the price adjustment is not the kind of even that can be 
spatially near any other event. Third, temporal proximity characterizes certain 
physical causes, as when a baseball ball strikes a ball and sends it flying – and this 
dœs seem to be one of the features we sometimes but not always associate with 
alleged historical and economic causes. Gibbon’s claim that the rise of Christianity 
caused the fall of the Roman Empire hypothesized slow-acting and hence temporar-
lly remote causal agency; the same is true of economic claims about the effect of 
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market freedom on desirable but far-flung economic outcomes. Finally, the relation-
ship of cause to effect is supposed to be asymmetrical. It is the cause that causes the 
effect, rather than the reverse. But apart from supposed physical causes that satisfy 
conditions of spatial and temporal contiguity, it is difficult to see how many causal 
explanations, especially of results involving human choices, can be seen as pos-
sessing this characteristic. 
 
Most importantly, the notion of a cause is unnecessary for mathematical sci-
ences such as physics, in which regularities involving allegedly related phenomena, 
usually quantitative features of these, are studied without the need for elevating one 
phenomenon above the rest as an efficient cause. The same is true for the type of 
theoretical explanation with which economic and other models of human behavior 
are concerned. A large literature deals with differences between the physical and the 
social sciences. In this respect, however, it is important to note that their goals and 
methods coincide in principle. 
 
All the more reason to regard the viability of judgments about tax neutrality 
as problematic. Even if we possessed a sufficiently developed economic model of 
the markets and other institutions that might be affected by the introduction of a tax 
measure, whether broad and comprehensive or incremental, it would be hard to give 
clear meaning to any conclusion about the causal role of such a tax measure in 
changing the behavior of the economic agents participating in the economic system 
in question.  
 
The tax policy literature in the US includes a noticeably polemical strain of 
economic argument on the basis of tax neutrality for such tax law reforms as corpo-
rate tax integration (removal by one means or another of one layer of our “double” 
corporate tax), replacement of the income tax with a consumption tax, and most 
recently, “mark-to-market” accounting for business debt (allegedly following Euro-
pean accounting standards). I describe these sub-literatures as polemical because 
their recommendations are more fulsome than their arguments warrant and that they 
represent the pros and cons of the issues selectively, generally, ignoring criticism or 
weaknesses in the positions advocated. Notable among the weaknesses in their posi-
tions that go unacknowledged is their blithe reliance on ceteris paribus conditions – 
in effect, they ignore offsets and other consequences of tax law changes that affect 
the tax neutrality of their proposals. 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF PUBLIC POLICY BASED ON TAX NEUTRALITY 
 
A good illustration of this misuse of the tax neutrality standard is found in the 
campaign by George W. Bush’s administration, spearheaded by Columbia econom-
ics professor Glenn Hubbard while serving as chairman of the President’s council of 
economic advisors. Hubbard proposed that corporate dividends should be not be 
taxed as income to the shareholders who received them; his proposal included no 
other adjustment of the corporate tax rules. He argued that this would make the US 
tax system more neutral in its effect on economic choices, relying on the enormous 
literature that advocates corporate tax integration (removal of the potentially dupli-
cative tax on corporate income that results under our corporate tax rules because 
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corporations are not allowed to deduct dividends and dividend recipients are not 
given credit for taxes previously paid by a distributing corporation). 
 
Hubbard, however, also argued that the elimination of the deduction tax 
would stimulate the economy, though it was pointed out that his own previous 
scholarly writing had argued that tax-free dividends would not be stimulative. Given 
such clear evidence that his public pronouncements were in part those of a zealous 
advocate for the Bush administration’s views, it is best to overlook this inconsis-
tency. Instead,  
 
Assuming that the classical corporate tax is distortive, it is far from obvious 
that the problem can be solved by eliminating the tax on dividends. Dividends, for 
one thing, are paid at the discretion of a corporation, and the US investing public is 
used to not receiving dividends, even when a corporation’s profits are substantial. 
Corporations on the whole do not pay dividends, and most US corporations pay very 
small dividends at best and some pay none at all. Moreover, not to tax dividends at 
all should be regarded as non-neutral if profits from the sale of stock are still taxed, 
even at our preferential capital gains rate, because stock sale proceeds may and usu-
ally do represent accumulated earnings, which are potential dividends. 
 
In the US virtually all corporations whose dividends are taxable are widely 
held and publicly traded. Smaller business enterprises that are incorporated usually 
qualify for the “subchapter S” election that results in immediate taxation of corpo-
rate earnings to shareholders and nontaxation of subsequent distributions by the 
corporation to the shareholders of the already taxed earnings. Other businesses are 
either directly held, so that their income is taxed to their owners just as wage or 
other income would be taxed, with the result that there is no chance of duplicative 
taxation of profits, or they are partnerships or limited liability companies, which are 
similarly immune to duplicative taxation of earnings, though with some greater 
flexibility in the rules governing the sharing of earnings among partners or owners. 
 
RELATIVE VS. ABSOLUTE JUDGMENTS OF TAX NEUTRALITY 
 
Before considering this problem in more detail, however, it is worthwhile to 
survey, if incompletely, the types of questions that may be asked about the neutrality 
of a tax rule. Are there any settings, any limited contexts in which we can realisti-
cally try to evaluate the neutrality of tax measures? 
 
Given the theoretical and factual difficulty of applying the tax neutrality 
standard, some commentators, including Professor Beltrame, have acknowledged 
that only relative neutrality can be evaluated (Pierre Beltrame & Lucien Mehl, 
Techniques, Politiques et Institutions Fiscales Comparées, Presses Universitaires de 
France, Paris, 1997, 2d edition, pages 314-315). Relative neutrality, however, can be 
understood in (at least) two ways. When we speak of the effect of a new law on the 
tax neutrality of the entire tax system, we may intend to refer only to the difference 
this incremental change makes to overall tax neutrality (the differential approach). 
We may, on the other hand, understand the relative neutrality of a tax measure to be 
the expected response of taxpayers and others to this change, regardless of how their 
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behavior may offset or aggravate existing non-neutral features of the pre-change tax 
system (the piecemeal approach).  
 
On the first approach, the effect of incremental change on overall neutrality 
thus depends not only on whether the change by itself would be tax neutral but also 
on whether its addition to the system will temper or aggravate the effect of other 
non-neutral features of the system. For example, if the status quo is already non-
neutral because a tax on a given product induces consumers to buy something else 
as a substitute, a tax measure that equalizes the tax on the two substitutable products 
will eliminate the previous non-neutral feature, although the new measure con-
sidered by itself is non-neutral. On this approach, however, short and long-term 
consequences must also be identified, and the net effect of these consequences must 
be evaluated. There is no self-evident standard for determining the net effect of short 
and long-term effects. In fact, any such standard would appear to imply political 
choices about the temporal horizon with which policy should be concerned.  
 
For example, a change in the rate at which corporate distributions are taxable 
to recipients may prompt a sudden but short-term increase in such distributions, 
stimulating the economy by making capital available to a wider range of invest-
ments than would have been the case if the distributed earnings had instead re-
mained in the hands of the distributing corporations. This stimulus would be an 
instance of tax non-neutrality, if considered in isolation from other events. It might, 
when considered together with other events, correct a previous distortion that had 
resulted in a lower level of economic activity. 
 
The piecemeal approach, however, which focuses only on the effect of a tax 
measure by itself on the neutrality of a tax system, assumes the system otherwise to 
have been neutral. This could coincide with the differential approach, if short-term 
effects of a tax measure outweighed other pre-existing non-neutral features and the 
correct standard for netting short and long-term effects were to give much greater 
weight to the short-term effects.  
 
In fact, we often do encounter judgments about the relative neutrality of a tax 
rule that could be intended as based on either the differential or the piecemeal ap-
proach. One common type of neutrality judgment deals with the announcement 
effects of overt tax differentiation among types of transactions or income, e.g., 
higher tax rates for the income of incorporated enterprises than for the income of 
unincorporated enterprises. When first announced, such differentiation may cause 
investment to be diverted from corporations to the low-tax sector, a result that is 
non-neutral at least in the short term. It is crucial to know whether a critic of the 
non-neutrality in question means to say that the tax system as a whole is made non-
neutral by the different tax rates (the differential approach) or only that it would be 
made non-neutral if the system were neutral to begin with (the piecemeal approach). 
The importance of the difference in this example is borne out by a well known work 
in the literature of tax design, viz., Arnold Harberger’s analysis showing that the 
long-term effect will be a higher rate on investment profits overall, and not just a 
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higher rate for corporate profits3. Political concern for short-term effects may (ra-
tionally?) override whatever confidence we may have in long-term equilibrium 
effects. If so, we may find it difficult to classify the approach to tax neutrality im-
plicitly used as differential or piecemeal. The result of the failure to distinguish the 
differential from the piecemeal approach, however, gives rise at least to ambiguity 
or worse. 
 
Judgments of tax neutrality that seem correct both from a piecemeal approach 
and from the differential approach may seem more secure for that reason. But they 
only straddle the two perspectives and are no more authoritative as such than the 
results of either approach are separately. 
 
The piecemeal approach is in fact by far the more commonly used in discus-
sions of tax neutrality of actual tax systems. Although judgments of tax neutrality in 
these discussions may allude to judgments of the overall neutrality of a tax system, 
e.g., to the alleged superiority of consumption taxation to income taxation, argu-
ments from the context in which the inexact nature of economic hypotheses is irrel-
evant, namely, the ideal context in which all hypotheses are true absolutely and not 
merely ceteris paribus, cannot safely be imported into the more difficult context of 
hypotheses whose limitations are “inexact”, i.e., impossible to specify. 
 
Detecting the absolute difference in tax neutrality due to the new legislation 
may also be possible by means of a general equilibrium model of the economy sub-
ject to the tax system. The success of efforts to “apply general equilibrium”, as John 
Shoven and John Whalley describe this project in the title of their 1993 book on the 
subject, is less than overwhelming. Nonetheless, the general goal of modeling gen-
eral equilibrium for a particular country’s economy is not far-fetched. One of the 
difficulties this raises, of course, is whether the “laws” of economic competition do 
indeed favor equilibrium, as neo-classical economics holds, or disequilibrium, as 
Keynesian economics plausibly claims. Shoven and Whalley found it difficult, using 
the best data available, to identify a point in time at which the US economy was 
almost in equilibrium. They were nevertheless committed to framing a model that 
assumed the economy tended towards equilibrium (John B. Shoven & John 
Whalley, Applying General Equilibrium, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1992 [Cambridge Surveys of Economic Literature]). 
 
If a strong measure of tax neutrality is not available, the relative measure 
may be of some value. In particular, it is possible that earlier non-neutral tax meas-
ures, to which a new piece of tax legislation is being added, have “lost” their non-
neutral effect because economic agents’ adjustment of their behavior to the initially 
non-neutral measures make those measures basic features of the environment in 
terms of which the markets of the economy in question are defined. 
 
Even if existing non-neutral tax measures have not structurally changed the 
economy, by becoming part of the background against which the economy is 
                                                           
3 The analysis of corporate tax incidence traces the impact of different tax rates on cororate profits from 
those on profits of unincorporated enterprises (Arnold HARBERGER, “The Incidence of the Corporate 
Income Tax”, 70 J. Pol. Econ. 215,1962). 
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defined, it is possible that these non-neutral tax measures are desirable for non-
economic reasons. If, for example, non-neutral tax measures protected human rights 
(or supported some other goal that is not compatible with perfect competition of free 
markets), the relative effect of a new tax measure on the non-neutrality of the exist-
ing measures would be of interest, because the new measure might exacerbate or 
improve the admittedly non-neutrality of the existing measures, because any positive 
improvement in the neutrality of the combined old and new measures would be 
desirable. 
 
Limited applications of the tax neutrality standard are not as demanding in 
principle as the absolute version discussed at the outset, but ordinary mortals are still 
unlikely to be able to assemble sufficient data to determine whether and to what 
extent an isolated real-world tax measure would affect the tax neutrality of existing 
tax laws.  
 
Yet there seems to be widespread consensus that we may speak, with some 
semblance of empirical content, about the tax neutrality of broad features of a tax 
system, or subsets of rules within a larger tax system. Perhaps the most prominent 
example of the former is the argument for the superiority of a consumption tax to an 
income tax based on the different costs these two kinds of tax in their purest forms 
would impose on deferred consumption (Karen Burke, “Lipstick, Light Beer, and 
Back-Loaded Savings Accounts”, Virginia Tax Review, Vol. 25, 2006, pages 1101, 
1147). Experts also sometimes examine the neutrality of corporate or partnership tax 
rules, restricting themselves to a consideration of consequences that might influence 
the consciously made economic decisions of corporations and partnerships in their 
primary profit-oriented activities.  
 
NEUTRALITY-BASED TAX POLICY IN U.S. TAX CASE LAW 
 
Decisions of U.S. courts have recognized the goal of relative tax neutrality 
under another name. The U.S. Supreme Court first articulated its “substance over 
form” standard for re-characterizing transactions (Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 
465 (1935)). The Court held that the tax motivation of a transaction should not de-
termine how it is taxed, but that economically similar transactions, those with simi-
lar “substance,” should be taxed alike, no matter what their formal differences; 
hence, “substance over form” is controlling. The “substance” to which the Court 
referred is invariably understood as the economic consequences of the transaction. (I 
will refrain from referring to the “substance over form” standard as an “economic 
substance” standard, however, because the latter phrase has come to mean some-
thing notably different, as will be discussed below.) The particular problem before 
the Court in Gregory was whether a multi-step transaction should be re-
characterized as a simple distribution by a corporation to its sole shareholder. The 
corporation had contributed property to a newly formed subsidiary and then distri-
buted the stock of the subsidiary to the parent’s sole shareholder, who caused the 
subsidiary to be liquidated. The three transactions had the same effect as a simple 
distribution of the property to the shareholder. The Court held that the substance of 
the transaction was a simple distribution to the shareholder and disregarded the 
multi-step form actually used, with the result that the distribution was a taxable 
dividend to the shareholder rather than a liquidating distribution on which no tax 
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would have been due. In a practical setting, as the Court itself obviously thought, it 
is possible to see through formal differences to the underlying economic reality of a 
transaction. When we exercise this type of x-ray vision, we are saying that in 
selected cases formally dissimilar transactions should be given the same tax 
treatment in order to prevent tax consequences from influencing the decisions of the 
relevant agents (corporate managers or directors in this context). 
 
Examples of reclassification based on “substance over form” nevertheless 
leave tax scholars puzzled. The ostensible goal is always to identify transactions that 
are somehow mischaracterized, usually by the taxpayer. The focus of the analysis, 
however, depends crucially on selection of “the transaction” to be analyzed (TSN 
Liquidating Corp. v. U.S., 624 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980)). A corporation engaged in 
an ongoing business can hardly be expected to make economic decisions in isolation 
from one another. Each of a corporation’s transactional decisions should be exam-
ined for its possible influence on others. In the context of analyzing a particular 
transaction, we may feel strongly that we can limit our attention to a small field of 
related transactions and decisions. The restrictive perspective adopted in such in-
stances, however, can only be justified by inarticulate intuition – it looks or feels 
right to ignore other transactional decisions as irrelevant, and we cannot say more. 
 
Viewed sympathetically, however, the judicial inquiry into the “substance” of 
a transaction has stronger empirical credentials than neutrality analyses based on 
broad economic modeling assumptions. When a court applies the substance-over-
form doctrine in a particular case, the question is a practical one: do economically 
equivalent transactions occur at all, and if so, what is their common form? The 
search for the common form is relevant, because the tax system should not accord 
different tax consequences to transactions that would be indistinguishable in a world 
without tax. Although we have no world without tax against which to make such a 
judgment, we do have some evidence of what that world would be like – the conduct 
of actual economic agents in our tax-laden world.  
 
What form dœs this evidence take? Courts have often treated the question 
whether a given formal structure is consistent with the substance of a transaction as 
interchangeable with the question whether there is a credible business reason for 
framing the transaction in this way – the so-called “business purpose” test. So com-
mon has this test become that the IRS has made it a specific regulatory requirement 
for certain tax outcomes4. The relationship between the business-purpose test and 
substance-over-form characterization of transactions depends on the de-centralized 
decision-making of actual taxpayers, the economic agents who engage in the similar 
transactions used as a benchmark in judicial determinations of this kind. If the par-
ties involved in a transaction have a substantial non-tax economic motive for en-
gaging in it, they would presumably engage in it in a no-tax world and the transac-
tion can be given the tax treatment corresponding under normal tax rules with the 
form of the transaction, because this application of the tax rules to all transactions of 
the same kind will not induce economic agents to alter their behavior. In principle, a 
choice that is over-determined – that would have been made in the absence of the 
                                                           
4 For example, a statutory merger of one corporation into another is eligible for nonrecognition treatment 
only if the merger has a business purpose. Gregory v. Helvering; Treas. Reg. § 1.368-1. 
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tax rules but that would have been made exclusively for tax reasons with the current 
tax rules in place – raises no concern as to the neutrality of the tax system. 
 
There are of course limits to the reliability of this or any kind of counterfac-
tual reasoning (David Lewis, Counterfactuals, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, Mass., 1973). A credible business reason for a transaction may still be a 
pretext, or it may be insufficient to rebut the allegation that the transaction in this 
context for this taxpayer is that rare exception to the otherwise prevailing pattern of 
similar transactions that are not fundamental tax-motivated (Joseph Bankman, “The 
Economic Substance Doctrine”, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 5, 2000, pages 23-26 (asking how 
much expected profit is enough to give a transaction a business purpose). The 
“weight” of factors influencing a decision is after all a metaphor; we have no scale 
for measuring degrees of influence of reasons.  
 
A principle on which the tax laws of many jurisdictions rely (France, Ger-
many, the US) is that the influence of tax considerations on a decision should not be 
taken into account in deciding whether the transaction should be re-characterized in 
order to preserve tax neutrality. But motivation is subtly relevant in a different re-
spect. If tax neutrality is the goal of preserving the decisions of economic agents 
from the influence of tax incentives and disincentives, the existence of motives that 
overwhelm any possible influence of these incentives and disincentives – motives 
related only to the profitability or other non-tax outcomes of the transaction – sup-
ports the conclusion that a transaction has not been influenced by the tax law. Thus, 
the question whether to re-characterize a particular transaction often reduces to the 
simpler question whether the transaction had a sufficient business purpose apart 
from tax considerations, even if tax considerations did in fact influence the decision 
as well. 
 
THE “ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE” DOCTRINE 
IN THE COURTS AND IN LEGISLATION 
 
Substance over form is just one of several "common law" doctrines in U.S. 
tax law. For example, courts have refused to recognize transactions that are sham as 
well as those that have no business purpose or economic substance. Since these 
doctrines are judge-made, a particular court’s interpretation of one or more of them 
may leave uncertainty about their relationship to each other and even about their 
distinctness. In recent litigation the economic-substance doctrine has begun to be the 
most frequently applied of these doctrines. One reason for this is an apparently de-
liberate government litigation strategy, which emphasizes economic substance be-
cause of its flexibility and perhaps because non-expert judges can more readily 
understand it than the other narrower doctrines that it resembles. Congress has re-
cently passed legislation that codified the economic-substance standard, thus ap-
proving the government’s position; after the IRS chief counsel objected, the codify-
ing language was removed from the last tax legislation5. The reason for the Chief 
                                                           
5 Chuck O’TOOLE, “Senate Overrides Farm Bill Veto; Tax Package Enacted”, 2008 Tax Notes Today 
101-1 (May 23, 2008) (deletion of “economic substance” codification from already passed legislation in 
order to override presidential veto); Jeremiah CODER, “Korb Again Condemns Idea of Codifying 
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Counsel’s opposition was that the codified version of the doctrine would make it 
more difficult to invoke in litigation, where the government has recently used the 
doctrine very successfully in its more flexible, common-law form6. 
 
The doctrine contains a subjective element that departs from the long estab-
lished principle that a tax-avoidance motive justify the denial to a taxpayer of a tax 
advantage linked to a given transaction, at least if there is a business purpose for the 
transaction. According to the emerging “economic substance” doctrine, whether the 
taxpayer’s transactions should be respected for tax purposes turns on both the "ob-
jective economic substance of the transactions" and the "subjective business moti-
vation" behind them. These aspects of the inquiry do not form part of a "rigid two-
step analysis," but instead are recognized as “related” factors that must be con-
sidered and may perhaps be given different weight in different cases. The facts of a 
case may apparently make one factor more important than the other; the facts of the 
case can perhaps make one factor override the other. 
 
The bipartite formulation of the economic substance analysis may mean no 
more than that a taxpayer who enters into a transaction for reasons other than favo-
rable tax consequences dœs not engage in the kind of tax-induced behavior that 
neutrality is meant to prevent. The important feature of the transaction would not be 
that the taxpayer had an innocent purpose or acted in good faith, and is therefore 
deserving of the sought-after favorable tax consequences. The intent of the taxpayer 
need not be the focus of the subjective prong of the doctrine. 
 
On the other hand, the subjective factor can easily be (mis)interpreted as the 
requirement that the taxpayer should not have been trying to improve his or her tax 
position. So interpreted, this prong would put the economic-substance doctrine at 
odds with the frequently recognized principle that that “there is nothing sinister in so 
arranging one’s affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible” (Commissioner v. 
Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (dissenting opinion of Hand, J.)). 
 
In fact, the judicial teaching is anything but clear on this point. Courts that 
have addressed the question have all affirmed that the objective element (closely 
resembling the business-purpose test) and the new subjective element are closely 
related (ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 1998); Saba P’ship v. 
Comm’r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 684, 713-15 (1999); UPS of Am., Inc. v. Comm’r, 78 
T.C.M. (CCH) 262, 270 (1999)). Only one recent decision, however, has confirmed 
the traditional view that a transaction for which there was a business purpose (“ob-
jective economic substance”) must respected for tax purposes, regardless of the 
taxpayer’s motivation (157 F.3d at 248). The courts are divided as to whether a 
transaction for which a positive subjective reason is found therefore passes muster, 
even though it lacks objective justification (Saba, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) at 713-15 (com-
paring Horn v. Comm’r, 968 F.2d 1229, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1992), with Kirchman v. 
Comm’r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989)). In practical terms, then, the tests 
are interrelated in those cases in which evidence as to objective intent is 
                                                                                                                                        
Economic Substance”, 2007 Tax Notes Today 209-6 (October 29, 2007) (IRS Chief Counsel opposes 
codification). 
6 Jeremiah CODER, op. cit. 
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inconclusive. In such cases, strong but not dispositive evidence of objective sub-
stance can offset weak evidence of subjective substance, and vice versa. 
 
Economic substance has become a predominant judicial standard for judging 
tax abuse in the course of the government’s long campaign against a new breed of 
tax shelters. Many of these tax shelters have common features – e.g., allocation of 
gain to a party that is exempt from tax in the U.S. and a related loss to a U.S. tax-
payer, or early recognition of a loss by a taxpayer who transfers responsibility for 
some later contingent liability to a separate entity in exchange for a current payment 
of the anticipated value of the loss. Even more conspicuous, however, are the com-
plexity of the transactions, evidently intended to disguise from the tax auditors what 
is going on, and the extreme disproportion between the taxpayer’s investment in the 
activity and the tax write-offs claimed7. The transactions thus are elaborately con-
trived, so that once they come to light, virtually all tax experts regard them as abu-
sive. Nevertheless, the deliberateness of the taxpayers’ quest for tax advantages is 
precisely the characteristic that previous case law had held irrelevant in determining 
validity. 
 
In practical terms, the difference between economic substance with its two 
elements and earlier neutrality-supporting common-law doctrines is that the subjec-
tive element of economic substance permits the government to introduce evidence of 
the contrived or strained nature of a transaction, as indirect evidence of the tax-
payer’s alleged abusive intention in using a disputed transaction form. For example, 
the government may show that the taxpayer’s professional advisers have used the 
same tax-advantaged structure for a number of clients, each of which has made a 
minimal investment in a cookie-cutter transaction with the prospect of dispropor-
tionate tax savings (Long Term Capital Holdings, LLC v. U.S., 330 F.Supp.2d 122, 
127 (D. Conn. 2004) (same taxpayer entered into two virtually identical tax-saving 
transactions with the help of the same team of tax advisers). While such evidence 
dœs not establish that the transaction is abusive, it dœs suggest that both the clients 
and the professional advisers regarded it simply as a way to deprive the government 
of tax revenue. Yet under previous tax doctrine, the tax avoidance motive by itself 
would not have supported re-characterization of the transaction. Similarly, the gov-
ernment may produce evidence that a tax adviser was approached after the taxpayer 
already knew that it was likely to receive a sizeable taxable gain (See, e.g., Stobie 
Creek Investments LLC v. U.S., No. 05-748T, 07-520T, __Fed.Cl. __, 2008 WL 
2968170 (July 31, 2008)). The timing alone suggests a tax avoidance motivation, but 
again, that motivation should not have been considered relevant under earlier ver-
sions of the common-law doctrines that were the government’s only weapons 
against tax abuse in the past. 
 
On the whole, the government’s use of economic substance has been closely 
allied with a broad litigation strategy aimed at remarkably deliberate and over-
reaching tax shelters. It is tempting to say, as many tax experts do in private, that 
these shelters are so glaringly abusive that close scrutiny and clear analysis are not 
                                                           
7 Jeremiah CODER, “Tax Shelter Penalties are Unclear and Weakly Enforced, Panelists Say”, Tax Notes, 
383, 384-85 (August 4, 2008)(summarizing the comments of Dennis Dohonue, chief senior leitigation 
counsel of the Justice Department Tax Division). 
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called for. It is probably true as well that few federal appellate judges have the spe-
cialized knowledge necessary to understand the genuine merits of transactions in-
volved in the shelters. The government’s litigation strategy is therefore dictated in 
part by the need to simplify the legal standard and allow the judges to rely on their 
intuitive assessment of the taxpayers’ conduct, inevitably focusing on the taxpayers’ 
motivation rather than on an objective application of tax principles, including that of 
neutrality. Unfortunately, this leaves the law in the precariously ad hoc and ad 
hominem state. 
 
Not all is lost, of course. The government is unlikely to argue that perfectly 
ordinary and modest examples of tax-sensitive business planning lack economic 
substance and are therefore invalid. On the other hand, tax professionals will find it 
even more difficult than previously to give a reasoned defense of the validity of 
these perfectly ordinary and modest tax positions. It could be said that, despite the 
problems raised by the concept of relative tax neutrality, the older common-law 
standards of substance over form and business purpose had at least some foundation 
in traditional tax policy, whereas the new standard, though expedient, is obscure. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
As my friend Pierre Beltrame correctly pointed out, tax neutrality is unattain-
able in the strict sense and yet relative tax neutrality is often a reasonable and em-
pirically ascertainable goal. I have argued that this is especially so when we are 
concerned primarily with the announcement effects of new tax measures and when 
our goal is to decide whether the tax treatment a taxpayer seeks is “neutral” in com-
parison with the treatment of other economically equivalent transactions. Recent 
developments in U.S. tax law suggest that the economic substance doctrine has 
something other than tax neutrality as its goal, when it gives the subjective motiva-
tion of the taxpayer a different significance than it had in the earlier common-law 
doctrine of substance over form. 
 
8/26/08 
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